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(Greek vase, attributed to Exekias, c. 530 BCE) 
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Abstract 
When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the 
question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recogni-
tion that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently 
been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic in-
vestigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without 
a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could 
become conscious of itself, I aim here to demonstrate that the terms experience 
and consciousness are not interchangeable. Experience is a notoriously difficult 
concept to pin down, but I see non-conscious experience as based mainly in mo-
mentary sensations, relational between bodies or systems, and probably common 
throughout the natural world. If this continuum of experience — from non-
conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and 
accepted, radical constructivism (the “outside” world as a construct of experi-
ence) will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism (a living universe) may 
gain credibility, and psi will find its medium.  
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Only then, when one has thrown light upon it and intellectualized it can one dis-
tinguish — and with what effort! — the shape of what one has felt.’ (Marcel 
Proust, 1934, p. 1014) 
 
Among the many other binary forks in the road toward the explanation and defi-
nition of consciousness is the one in which some loosely identify consciousness 
with experience (and often, generously, with awareness too despite the fact that 
this term connotes less specificity and individually-limited attention), and others 
make a distinction between conscious experience and experience without the 
added quality of consciousness, i.e., non-conscious experience. It seems likely 
that the way we explain and define conscious experience directly affects the man-
ner in which we consciously experience. Experience, as we know it, may well be a 
manifestation of our preconceptions of it. It is thus very important that we pro-
ceed cautiously when eliding similar definitions into one another. 
 
Panpsychist philosopher Christian de Quincey (2002) calls the open or phenom-
enal understanding of consciousness the philosophical one: any microbiological 
twitch or sensation is understood as consciously experienced. The more closed 
(also known elsewhere as the subjective or cognitive) definition — in which con-
sciousness is underlain by subconscious or unconscious mind or in which non-
conscious or unconscious experience is reflected back upon itself through higher 
order processing and becomes conscious of itself — he calls the psychological one. 
(I’m applying my own terminology to what I take to be de Quincey’s intent.) The 
psychological definition he calls self-reflective awareness, but then this implies 
there is awareness that is not self-reflective, or, in my terms, does not have a sub-
ject or self to do the reflecting.  
 
He’s right about the majority psychological practice here, but there are problems 
with his open philosophical definition of ‘consciousness all the way down’, in-
cluding that many professional philosophers do in fact stand by what he calls the 
psychological definition, but also that the open ‘philosophical’ or phenomenal 
definition does not leave room for non-conscious, subconscious, or preconscious 
processing (which might be understood as purely organic or even inorganic expe-
rience). It should further be borne in mind that human conscious experience is 
all we know of experience, so, when we use the term ‘consciousness’ for all forms 
of awareness, we can only be assuming our own conscious experience as the ref-
erent for all the other forms consciousness may take. 
 
 There are those who equate conscious experience with experience in all forms 
while distinguishing reflective or self-consciousness from both. Then there are 
others who distinguish conscious experience from experience in itself but identify 
reflective or self-consciousness with conscious experience itself. The previous 
sentence is worth reading again if you don't quite get it because it summarizes the 
two major conceptual positions that still contend for the final word in defining 
consciousness. A look at some of the publications that surround me illustrate the-
se two contending sides in this subtle and important turf war of the mind.  
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Materialist-mysterian philosopher Colin McGinn (1999) defines consciousness as 
the property of any 'experiencing subject' and, for him, such subjectivity is pre-
sent in dreaming states and in anything that experiences. So an entity such as a 
nematode that experiences momentary sensations, but does not have the capacity 
or symbolic tools to realize it is doing so, would nonetheless be understood as be-
ing conscious. The human capacity to become aware of one's own sensations and 
life in general adds nothing but reflection for McGinn; it is the experience not the 
knowing that counts: 'To experience those sensations is not the same as to think 
that you experience them, or to say that you do. We do often reflect on our own 
experiences and tell each other about them. So we should not confuse conscious-
ness with self-consciousness' (pp. 2-3). Velmans (2000) siding with McGinn, 
simply states, 'A person, or other entity, is conscious if they experience some-
thing; conversely, if a person or entity experiences nothing, they are not con-
scious' (p. 6). 
 
Contrarily, David Cohen (1998), in his illustrated attempt to speak for main-
stream psychology, states:  
 
Although no broad consensus exists as to the precise meaning of con-
sciousness, it can be described as the state of mind that allows us to ‘know’ 
our own mind, to entertain thoughts about thoughts, to monitor our selves 
and our environments, and to use this information to make plans and for-
mulate hopes and fears (p. 67). 
 
Like Cohen, those of the ‘higher order’ thought (HOT) or perception school of 
philosophy insist that knowledge of one’s own experiencing is one step removed 
from that experience in itself and precisely equate consciousness with self-
consciousness, as do the symbolists and phenomenologists (see Zahavi, 2005). 
Tor Nørretranders (1998) agrees, adding the qualities of self-consciousness to 
consciousness itself: ‘Consciousness is the experience of experiencing, the 
knowledge of knowing, the sense of sensing’ (p. i). 
 
Up to this point, it seems almost a matter of choice, with the slight problem that 
we can know nothing certain about the experience of non-human entities or in-
fants. Language at least allows other persons to tell us of their experiencing. 
There are more considerations, however, that add a particular intensity to this 
question, since the uniqueness and autonomy of conscious experience are at 
stake. 
 
Dictionaries, even specialist dictionaries, are not going to be of much help since 
they merely reflect the contraries of common usage. It may be a point worth not-
ing, however, that the etymology of the term ‘conscious’ indicates its origin in the 
Latin conscius: ‘knowing with others, participating in knowledge’ and is in accord 
with the first definition given by the Houghton-Mifflin Dictionary of the English 
Language (Morris, 1982) for ‘Conscious: Having an awareness of one’s own exist-
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ence, sensations, and thoughts, and of one’s environment.’ Not only does this et-
ymology suggest that consciousness implies knowing of one’s own somatic feel-
ings, sensations, and experiencing, but also knowing with others: com- together 
+ scire- to know, suggesting the intersubjective intermingling of conscious selves. 
Non-conscius experience is left as possibility in this definition. Needless to say, 
dictionary definitions indicating otherwise can be found. 
 
Experience is another term so many of us assume to understand but which, on 
the contrary, proves to have a long history of variable meanings. Cultural histori-
an, Martin Jay, recently did a history of philosophy survey of these often conten-
tious meanings in western culture called Songs of Experience (2005). To frame 
his study, Jay early on explores the two German words with slightly different 
meanings that are both translated into English by the word ‘experience’. One of 
them suggests ‘raw’ or ‘pure’ experience, unmediated by language or subjectivity 
so it remains unconscious of itself. The other equates more readily with the 
common English assumption that experience always implies conscious experi-
ence. 
 
Erlebnis contains within it the root for ‘life’ (Leben) and, according to Jay, ‘is of-
ten taken to imply a primitive unity prior to any differentiation or objectification. 
... Although Leben connotes the entirety of a life, Erlebnis generally connotes a 
more immediate, pre-reflective, and personal variant of experience...’ (p. 11). This 
implies a meaning for experience that does not necessarily accord with our as-
sumed meaning for conscious in that Erlebnis is ‘immediate, pre-reflective, and 
personal…’. In this case it can be seen that Erlebnis as experience simpliciter is 
not the same as reflective conscious experience. Like the unconscious of psycho-
analysis, it may be thought of as non-conscious experience. 
 
Erfahrung, the other German term we translate as experience, is on the other 
hand more associated with differentiating sense impressions or making cognitive 
judgments about them. ‘But,’ says Jay, ‘it also came to mean a more temporally 
elongated notion of experience based on a learning process, an integration of dis-
crete moments of experience into a narrative whole or an adventure’. Its roots are 
found in the German word for journey (Fahrt) that may connote a journey into 
the unknown (Fahrt ins blaue), like the journey through life: ‘As such, it activates 
a link between memory and experience, which subtends the belief that cumula-
tive experience can produce a kind of wisdom that comes only at the end of the 
day’ (p. 11). Erfahrung seems to be more in accord with our common under-
standing of experience, as ‘the best teacher’ or as the remembered present, which 
equates roughly with the consensus understanding of conscious experience (or 
consciousness, if you must). 
 
Though Jay does not deal directly with the question of how experience and con-
scious experience may be related, if at all (which is a major lapse in a book whose 
intention is to explore all meanings of the term experience), some of the authors 
he reviews do take a stand for direct, non-conscious experience as the precursor 
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and foundation of subjective consciousness. Jay refers to the ‘paradoxical notion’ 
(p. 129) of experience without a subject (or, sometimes, from another angle, 
post-epistemological experience) and notes the idea has been posited approving-
ly by no less than Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Benjamin, Adorno, Bataille, Fou-
cault, Barthes, and possibly Oakeshott, Dewey, and the trickster of text, Derrida. 
Experience without a subject of that experience cannot easily be subsumed under 
the label of consciousness. It may be more along the lines of the non-subjective 
yet relational and experiential interaction between organism and environment 
(cf. Järvilehto, 2000, 2oo4).  
 
Finally, some of the poststructuralist or deconstructive authors cited like Jacques 
Lacan insist that experience, as such, cannot be posited as a meaningful term at 
all. As Lacan’s translator, Alan Sheridan (1977) put it: ‘What is prior to the as-
sumption of the symbolic, the real in its “raw” state (in the case of the subject, for 
instance, the organism and its biological needs), may only be supposed, it is an 
algebraic x’ (pp. ix-x).  This simply implies that we cannot be conscious of non-
conscious experience. 
 
Another point toward considering conscious experience as distinct from experi-
ence per se is that we have by now much evidence for non-conscious experience 
and widespread — dare I say subliminal? — acceptance of it. Literary history is 
replete with finely drawn characters thinking they were guiding their lives by 
their rational conscious choices but were actually being driven by emotions or 
even instincts beyond the ken of their own subjective awareness, as the astute 
reader would observe. Other times, we all have witnessed characters — both in 
literature and in life — who have struggled mightily to avoid disturbing truths 
they sense subconsciously (as we say) or who overcompensate for certain semi-
conscious deficiencies, e.g., the braggart or bully. (See appendix.) 
 
For experience to become conscious, it must be readied for intellection. It must 
be sliced, diced, and made an object of the mind, as Marcel Proust (1934), that 
indefatigable investigator of memory, well knew: 
 
One experiences, but what one has experienced is like those negatives 
which show nothing but black until they have been held before a lamp, and 
they, too, must be looked at from the reverse side; one does not know what 
it is until it has been held up before the intelligence. Only then, when one 
has thrown light upon it and intellectualized it can one distinguish — and 
with what effort! — the shape of what one has felt (p. 1014). 
 
It’s hardly fair to say that Sigmund Freud (e.g., 1965) discovered the unconscious 
at the beginning of the last century. He did, however, bring it into the lexicon of 
daily human speech. Equating symbolic culture and cognition with conscious-
ness, Freud’s deeper epigonus, C.G. Jung (1971), who expanded the idea of the 
unconscious into the collectivity of all life, flatly declared: ‘It is just man's turning 
away from instinct — his opposing himself to instinct — that creates conscious-
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ness,’ adding, significantly, ‘Instinct is nature and seeks to perpetuate nature, 
whereas consciousness can only seek culture or its denial’ (p. 3). The term is mis-
leading, however, in that unconscious has the connotation of a coma-like state, 
lacking both consciousness and experience.  
 
There is not the space here to explore the great divide that allowed embodied ex-
perience to become conscious of itself, but Jung’s suggestion is worth noting: The 
cultural communion of language is precisely the condition of applying symbolic 
categorizations to experience to make it seem objective to conscious subjectivity. 
Human culture is dependent on relationships in which those attaining conscious 
selfhood expect others in their culture world to do so too. This relationship is in-
tersubjective in that it both sustains and draws forth conscious subjects of experi-
ence. We simply are not conscious of non-conscious experience until we, via the 
relationships of cultural intersubjectivity, make it so. 
 
In his watershed book, Julian Jaynes (1976) made the point even more simply: 
‘Consciousness is a much smaller part of our mental life than we are conscious of, 
because we cannot be conscious of what we are not conscious of’ (p. 23). He con-
tinued with an apt metaphor:   
 
How simple that is to say; how difficult to appreciate! It is like asking a 
flashlight in a dark room to search around for something that does not 
have any light shining up on it. The flashlight, since there is light in what-
ever direction it turns, would have to conclude that there is light every-
where. And so consciousness can seem to pervade all mentality when actu-
ally it does not (p. 23). 
 
It should be noted that no one is implying the line between the light of conscious 
apprehension and experiencing ‘in the dark’ is sharp or apparent or that there are 
not important degrees of difference within what I am calling non-conscious expe-
rience and conscious experience. Experience is a continuum, as Alfred North 
Whitehead explained. Neither between human individuals nor amongst species 
can the line of distinction be clearly drawn.  
 
As one of the first philosophers (as distinct from psychoanalysts and literary au-
thors) to make use of the distinction, Whitehead (1978) wrote: 
 
Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal re-
gion of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience 
which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. The simplicity of 
clear consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete experi-
ence.  Also this character of our experience suggests that consciousness is 
the crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base 
(p. 267). 
 
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2010 | Vol. 1 | Issue 3 | Page 215-233 
Nixon,	G.	M.		From	Panexperientialism	to	Conscious	Experience 
 
ISSN:	2153-8212	 Journal	of	Consciousness	Exploration	&	Research	
Published	by		QuantumDream,	Inc.	
www.JCER.com	
 
221 
As Whitehead indicates, consciousness is the proverbial tip of the iceberg of a 
whole world of experiencing whose bottom or origin, if there is one, is shrouded 
in mystery and must be, by definition, unknowable. Consciousness itself, as self-
consciousness, may be ‘the crown of experience’ since it is that which knows and 
seems to guide long term planning. However, whether the consciousness we daily 
experience is the ‘crown’ of all potential experiencing remains to be seen.  
 
Uncomfortable as it may be to some, there is wide evidence that the conscious 
does not direct decisions in the immediate present. Not only current behaviours 
but even the flow of individual thoughts may be ignited from a source whose 
origin disappears beyond the light of consciousness. This is to say that the pro-
cess of consciousness may less determine what we do or experience, even in the 
future, than it (consciousness) is itself determined by pre- or non-conscious expe-
rience. Non-conscious experience, unlike the unconscious, includes the term ‘ex-
perience’ because it is responsive and effectual (if not exactly efficient). In the 
end, however, the cycle must be mutually creative, consciousness taking aim and 
the unconscious powers working toward or against it in the present, the dialogue 
of how we become. 
 
Arguments against distinguishing between experience as such and experience 
that has become conscious of itself have been stubborn and steadfast. They usual-
ly insist that experience means consciousness in everyday speech, and that’s that. 
I hope I have shown that the historical use of the term is not nearly so consistent. 
If something is experienced, it must have been consciously attended to, so the ar-
gument goes, otherwise it is merely something like autonomic activity. But non-
conscious experience is not just autonomic. Non-attended (non-subjective) expe-
rience has affect — that is, it disturbs or creates emotions — and it has notable 
effects, too, on actual behaviour or on thought.  
 
The late, highly respected physiology researcher Benjamin Libet noted this as 
early as 1965:  
 
It has become generally accepted that a large, perhaps even a major part of 
our mental activities can take place without our being consciously aware of 
them. Though apparently unconscious, they are nevertheless part of signif-
icant mental experience since there is evidence that such activities can par-
ticipate in later mental and behavioral manifestations — cognitive, affec-
tive, or conative (p. 77). 
 
Consciousness is certainly dependent on the animal capacity for experience. If it 
were not, consciousness could not be experienced and consciousness without ex-
perience is difficult to conceive (though this may be the goal of AI research). Con-
versely, experience without consciousness — that is, experience as responsive in-
teractions within an ecosystem or perhaps any complex system (as opposed to a 
culture) but without any sort of awareness of that experience — is less difficult. 
Experience without knowledge or conceptual cognition throws into doubt the 
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whole assumption of there being any sort of internal, centralized experiencer (or 
subject of experience, the homunculus) in other natural organisms as we imagine 
there being in ourselves. Is there a little experiencing bat-munculus within bats?  
 
Despite what many would argue, experiencing interaction with an environment 
in no way necessitates there being an inner representation of such an environ-
ment: The interaction may itself be the mutual moment of experience, existing 
like a flash of electricity between entities not within them (or not necessarily in 
one centralized subjective location within). Experience may be modular and not 
centralized in ‘lower’ organisms but occurring in, say, a limb. Without memory or 
anticipation, the experience would consist only of the second or so of interaction 
in itself. (Louis Gidney, 2007, offers a more sophisticated version of this ‘rela-
tional existing’.)  We are not in the position to assume an organism is a self-
contained monad warring with nature instead of it being an aspect of nature ex-
periencing itself (as a sentient response system — or systems). As the cliché goes, 
the lights might be on, but there may be no one (no self or subjective centre) 
home. The body is the entity itself, one pole of dynamic sentient experience. 
 
What we are conscious of is experience. The world is the experienced world, not a 
mechanical-material objective entity that is the same for all who experience it, 
perceptively or otherwise. Raw experience is changed when it attains the quality 
of being conscious of itself. It changes from a blindly felt reality process into an 
object of knowledge, an artifact of memory. By knowing it, we interpret it; we 
change it into symbols; we stabilize its dynamic mutability. We re-cognize it and 
make it our lived reality. Experience is divided into subject and object. 
 
Conscious experience is understood here as a threshold that, once crossed, can-
not be uncrossed without losing, in essence, consciousness. As Ernst Cassirer 
(1944) put it, noting that the threshold of the symbolic leads away from natural 
processes:  
 
Yet there is no remedy against this reversal of the natural order. Man can-
not escape from his own achievement. He cannot but adopt the conditions 
of his own life. No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a 
symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this uni-
verse. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tan-
gled web of human experience. (p. 25) 
 
One may wonder, finally, what difference this distinction makes. When we al-
ready have terms like the unconscious mind or the convoluted panprotopsy-
chism, what need have we to stress non-conscious experience? This question 
alone is worth another major essay to consider the options. As I indicated above, 
I see experience as Whitehead did, not really consisting of just two types, but as a 
continuum from momentary flashes into existence of ‘occasions of experience’ 
(probably related to quantum fluctuations) to the boundaryless experience which 
blossoms into transpersonal awareness. Many of us would not be willing to grant 
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consciousness to a nematode or to a paramecium, much less to a subatomic pilot 
wave collapse, yet the former two at least are living entities that respond to 
changes in their environment. In fact the changes of one part of an ecosystem, in 
this case, an individual organism, causes changes in the entire ecosystem, so in-
terrelated and connected are all the parts. Such responses by both organism and 
environment can be parsimoniously imagined as most likely concurrent with ex-
periencing; this would explain the incredible balance and coherence of living and 
other systems. It also suggests that coherent systems, especially ecosystems, are 
harmonized by their multi-centric experiencing. Sub-atomic occasions of experi-
ence I leave for Whiteheadians and quantum physicists like Henry Stapp (1979) 
to explore, though this is a rich field for speculation. 
 
Radical constructivism has suffered criticism because naïve skeptics ask, ‘You 
mean the world out there is like that because we make it so? We could just change 
it at will?’ Some constructivists have tried some interesting contortions to explain 
why, if reality is a construction of conscious experience, we cannot just wish it to 
be what we want. Non-conscious experience better fits the explanation of our 
lived world being a world conditioned by experience, perceived as the result of 
past experience — and this would include the experience of species and all that 
evolved into our species and all that went before that and is still unfolding today. 
 
The need of psi or so-called extra-sensory perception for non-conscious experi-
ence should be self-explanatory. In this view, psi phenomena probably happen to 
everyone all the time, since we are mimetic, relational, interconnected cultural 
creatures. This is denied by various attempts to demonstrate conscious control 
over such paranormal apperceptions or activities. But if the receiving, sending, 
sharing, or actively applying of paranormal psi phenomena is accepted within 
non-conscious experience both its elusiveness and reality can be explained. 
 
The point here is that experience without consciousness or a subject of that expe-
rience opens the door to filling a major lacuna in the theorizing of panpsychists 
and radical constructivists, not to mention psi researchers. Panpsychism is relat-
ed to animism, the ancient sense of a cosmos alive with minds in all entities and 
phenomena. A humanlike mind in all things is too much for most of us today to 
accept but a form of non-conscious experience may not be. David Skrbina (2009) 
has recently published a collection of philosophy essays mostly supporting 
panpsychism, but my review (2009) points out how pre-conscious panexperien-
tialism would solve much confusion. This seems to be the idea of what the clumsy 
term panprotopsychism was attempting to conjure. A better suggestion is panex-
perientialism, apparently first used by D.R. Griffin (Cobb & Griffin, 1977) with 
reference to Whitehead’s process cosmology, though Whitehead himself would be 
best described as a panentheist because of his Godism. If panexperientialism 
seems to grant too much to sensation, try the agonized panprotoexperientialism 
so the presumed mechanical rudiments of experiencing appear everywhere on the 
scene first. However, only panexperientialism implies straightforwardly that the 
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entire universe is in some way alive or has the potential of becoming so at any 
time anywhere.  
 
One can see that the implications of universal experiencing are startling, perhaps 
even awe-inspiring. If rudimentary experience began with sensations derived 
from relational encounters between two fundamental entities, which later be-
came internalized within each entity as its own via physiological memory traces 
(thus, in essence, creating an experiencing entity), as Deiss (2009) has suggested 
(though he still equates experience with consciousness), it seems to me some po-
tential for such experience must precede or surround it. I suggest such a potential 
for relational experience pre-exists as universal awareness-in-itself, a sort of 
background radiation of the psyche that is without objects of awareness, inten-
tionality, or self-direction (indeed without self). Any way we conceive of this un-
conscious yet aware potential existence must be insufficient, though I must sug-
gest any awareness without content cannot really be said to even exist as any sort 
of active principle or entity. Perhaps it is nearest to the void consciousness of the 
mystics that is without attributes, so about which nothing sensible can be said 
(and ‘it’ certainly resembles no known conceptions of God or gods). Yet from this 
slumbering source somehow spring both rudimentary entities and their experien-
tial interactions (which thus incarnate this empty awareness-in-itself). Some few 
in science have also seen the need to conceive of this inconceivable semi-existent 
source.  This fundamental, essential, yet invisible bond — the source, foundation, 
and end of all things — is thought to ‘exist’ as infinite energy potential everywhere 
in what has been called the quantum vacuum, quantum flux, quantum foam, 
ZPE, dark energy, Erwin Laszlo’s Akashic Field (2004), Hu and Wu’s (2010) 
prespacetime, and so on. Needless to say, such an invisible pan-present non-
presence as experience-in-waiting (awareness-in-itself) would have zero dimen-
sions (o-D) and remain at time-zero in the eternal present. 
 
With this in mind, I suggest the distinction between conscious experience (aka 
consciousness) and experience as such is well worth making. If the terminology 
offends, call it unconscious experience, consciousness without mind, core con-
sciousness, or experience without a subject, as others have. The idea remains the 
same. What is it like to be a bat, to have non-conscious experience? We do it all 
the time, but we return with no memory of it or, at best, a shudder, a fading sen-
sation, an evanescent image, a fleeting dream in the hollows of memory. 
 
 
 
Appendix 
TWENTY-ONE INDICATORS 
of Non-Conscious Experience  
 
EMPIRICAL ABNORMAL 
1. Blindsight. This is the premier example in the science community. When one 
feels oneself to be blind (in fact consciously blind) yet responds appropriately to 
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2010 | Vol. 1 | Issue 3 | Page 215-233 
Nixon,	G.	M.		From	Panexperientialism	to	Conscious	Experience 
 
ISSN:	2153-8212	 Journal	of	Consciousness	Exploration	&	Research	
Published	by		QuantumDream,	Inc.	
www.JCER.com	
 
225 
certain visual stimuli, what can be said about that one's responses? How can we 
account for readings that indicate a brain in action, a body galvanically respond-
ing? Most important, how can we account for knowledge gained and displayed 
yet consciously denied? Must it not be said that one has seen non-consciously 
and that one has gained knowledge non-consciously? Of course. On the other 
hand it is clear that the total person has had a visual experience and can in some 
sense recall and refer to the information gained. To deny that one has experi-
enced those visual impressions would be to deny that any information processing 
has occurred, which is clearly not the case. Ergo, the person has experienced non-
consciously. (See, e.g., Blindsight (May 1999); Stoerig & Cowey, 1997; and of 
course Weiskrantz, 1986.) 
 
2. Anton’s Syndrome, the denial of blindness, almost the opposite of above, a 
type of anosognosia. Anosognosia ‘denotes the inability to recognize a state of 
disease in one's own organism’ (Damasio 1999, pp. 209-10). This is the situation 
where a person has become physiologically blind yet still consciously experiences 
a world of sight. The visual world is, apparently, projected from memory. This is 
hardly enough to deal with the real world, so despite conscious denial, soma 
moves about, bumping into things, stumbling, falling, not sharing in the percep-
tions being discussed. The conscious mind continues to believe it is seeing, but 
here the living body is doubtlessly experiencing blindness and its the effects. 
 
3. Prosopagnosia, the most dramatic form of anosognosia (a symptom of se-
vere mental illness experienced by some that impairs a person's ability to under-
stand and perceive his or her illness.), facial anosognosia. Here consciousness can 
no longer recognize faces, even those once intimately known. Yet cases abound 
where brain activation and skin galvanization reveal that on some level the face is 
being recognized. In some cases, there are even strong emotional responses to the 
‘forgotten’ face but the subject does not know why. In one case, a stroke victim 
with facial anosognosia was confronted with his brother with whom he had been 
very close. He sadly shook his head, asking the doctor who this person was. But 
his galvanic response became electric, nasal passages flared, eyes dilated, breath-
ing became laboured, body temperature rose, he flushed, and his heart beat more 
rapidly. His non-conscious being — his body! — experienced full recognition. His 
conscious mind did not. Obviously, recognition is being non-consciously experi-
enced. When one’s physical being is obviously experiencing a response, it would 
be sheer dualism to say the person is not, since it would exclude the body from 
the person! (See, e.g., Sacks 1985.) 
 
4. Amnesia. Similar to the above, there are cases of physiological and emotional 
responses to people not consciously remembered. There are also confirmed cases 
of procedural memory recalled and acted upon though the conscious mind denies 
such acts are possible. Learning itself, in these cases, often takes place non-
consciously. (See, e.g., Rosenfield, 1992; Schacter, 1987, 1996.) 
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5. Split Brain Experiments. After the division of the corpus callosum, most 
subjects function normally. As is well known, however, consciousness — accord-
ing to the conscious subjects themselves — most often resides in the symbol pro-
cessing left hemisphere. It does no good to explain the perception, learning, and 
responses centered in the right hemisphere as another sort of consciousness 
when the subject denies any sort of awareness of such experiences. Again, physio-
logical and emotional response readings indicate that subjects are experiencing, 
but are not conscious of it. (See, e.g., Gazzaniga, 1970; Sperry, 1965, 1983.) 
 
6. Sleepwalking. People will do things in a state of somnambulance — deep, 
non REM sleep, non-insane automatism — and later have no memory of such ac-
tions.  Sleepwalkers encountered, however, sometimes appear to be perceiving 
and even feeling emotions (though they probably also look absent). Ken Parks, a 
Canadian, was found not guilty of murder for rising, driving his car 23 kilometres 
away, maiming his father-in-law and killing his mother-in-law because he was 
sleepwalking. However, Scott Falater, an Arizonan with a history of sleepwalking, 
who knifed his wife to death in the family pool in 1997 was found guilty as 
charged (see Homicidal Somnambulism in Wikipedia). 
 
7. Dream Effects. There are many anecdotal reports of people's moods being 
altered by dreams of the night before, none of which have contents that can be 
explicitly recalled. There are after-effects & after affect. Were the dreams then not 
experienced? Dream effects are not abnormal, but they are not normally consid-
ered an aspect of daily consciousness. (cf. Hillman, 1979; Laberge, 2004) 
 
8. Alcohol/Drug Effects. There are many cases of someone being so bamboo-
zled by drugs (including alcohol) that they walk, talk, emote, & suffer but the per-
son everyone knows simply is not present. The lights appear to be on but there is 
nobody home, and later the individual retains no conscious memory or only 
fragments thereof. Obviously, somatic experience of some sort is occurring but to 
the conscious person, later, such experiences are dismissed as blackouts. Blacked 
out people are sometimes able to drive, travel, work and generally function in so-
ciety, all the while operating without forming memory. Others are more obviously 
in a zombie state yet still moving about. (See, e.g., Sweeney & Liston, 2004.) 
 
9. Post-Hypnotic Suggestion. People will do actions or experience feelings 
they have not consciously instigated under post-hypnotic suggestion. In fact con-
sciousness reveals itself as the great rationalizer or excuse maker here: When a 
person suddenly awakes from a hypnotic suggestion to discover herself running 
down the hallway of a crowded auditorium, she improvises explanations on the 
spot for her actions, for she clearly has no idea why she was doing the action. Was 
she not experiencing but unconscious when under the influence of post-hypnotic 
suggestion? 
 
EMPIRICAL NORMAL 
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10. Implicit Memory/Learning/Knowledge or Priming. Getting away 
from somewhat aberrant forms of experience, research in cognitive science has 
confirmed that there is a whole field of knowledge that is non-conscious but 
which continues to have effects on behaviour and cognitive associations. The 
knowledge is known, the memories remembered, the learning learnt — but im-
plicitly, that is, non-consciously. These, and much more, are part of what has 
been called the ‘cognitive unconscious’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Even a hardline 
neurologist like J.A. Hobson (1999) accepts this. Subliminal memory priming 
should be included here (cf., Schacter, 1987, 1989, 1996; Thomas, 1997). Polanyi 
(1958) called his epistemological version tacit knowing. 
 
11. Subliminal Perception. Related to the above. In an infamous Republican 
ad from the U.S. Bush/Gore presidential election, the word ‘Democrat’ was 
shown then quickly the last three letters of the word were zeroed in on (RAT), 
magnified and flashed briefly across the TV screen too quickly to be consciously 
perceived by most. The hope, apparently, was that viewers would unconsciously 
connect ‘democrat’ with ‘rat’. The subliminal perception and response is non-
conscious experience. (See, e.g., Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc, 1983; Merikle & 
Daneman, 1998.) 
 
12. Habitual Behaviour. When one behaves automatically from behaviours so 
well learned that conscious attention is not necessary, one may be said to be ex-
periencing the actions non-consciously (e.g., highway driving, riding a bicycle). 
Procedural memory itself often becomes unconscious. One need merely reflect 
upon one’s lived experience or see again, for example, Schacter, 1987, 1989, 1996. 
 
13. Reflex Actions. Both the kind the nervous system does spontaneously — 
i.e., blinking, pulling back a digit from something hot — and the unusual reflex 
actions of someone in crisis. It would also include the best athletes who act before 
consciousness can process a plan or remember clearly such actions later. In the 
latter case, it may be said that non-conscious experience is an achievement. (See, 
e.g., Williams, 2004.) 
 
THEORETICAL 
14. Pre-Conscious and Feral Humans. Humans who have not learned any 
form of symbolic communication may be said to be experiencing non-
consciously. There is no doubt of their somatic perceiving or their raw emotions, 
but mental experience, for them, verges on being contentless. As Helen Keller 
spoke about her state before awakening to other minds through symbolic com-
munication: ‘I cannot hope to describe adequately that unconscious, yet con-
scious time of nothingness’ (1910, p. 113). Obviously an ‘unconscious, yet con-
scious time of nothingness’ is not unconscious like a rock, but it clearly is not 
consciousness as she came to it later. Were she here, I'd wager that Ms Keller 
would be grateful for the reconceptualization of ‘non-conscious experience’. This 
semi-neologism applies to infants as well. (Also see Candland, 1993; Shattuck, 
1994.) 
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15. Non-Human Animals. In this way, the experience of infrahuman animals 
may be conceived. Though it cannot be proven since they refuse to talk to us, it 
appears non-mammals and mammals with limited cerebral cortices experience 
‘in the dark’. Their experiencing, feeling, and acting may well be driven only by 
the evolved instinctual wisdom of their species. Complex nonhuman mammals 
may experience anomalous blips of individualized conscious awareness, especial-
ly those living in highly social environments with elaborate communication sys-
tems, e.g., cetaceans, or those brought up by humans. (See Budiansky, 1998; 
Kennedy, 1992.) 
 
16. Psychoanalysis. Though Freudian theories and therapies have been much 
disparaged, they remain noteworthy for introducing the concept of the uncon-
scious mind to a wide audience. There is little doubt that all of us suppress and 
even repress unpleasant memories and disguise our less pleasant motivations 
even from our selves (ego consciousness). Such repressions and disguises contin-
ue to affect us, so the non-conscious mind consists of experiences. Freud’s epigo-
ni have not abandoned this central concept. For Lacan (1977), the unconscious is 
structured like a language, and Kristeva (1982) feels our repressed horror is the 
loss of Mother. (See, e.g., Freud, 1965; Brown, 1959; Sayers, 1993.) 
 
17. The Collective Unconscious and Mythic Memory. Mythic images and 
tales tell of the creation of personhood and self-agency, whether these myths are 
heroic (Promethean fire-theft) or punitive (Adam and Eve’s expulsion). Some of 
Jung’s progeny like Neumann (1954) call upon world mythology as testimony to 
the defeat of non-conscious instinct (the uroboros) by culture-bringing heroes. 
Myth and language have been seen as ‘twin creatures’ which together have al-
lowed us to symbolize our own experience and thus re-present it to ourselves 
consciously by such as Cassirer (1946). Here non-conscious experience would 
naturally arise from the archetypes of the collective unconscious (i.e., the experi-
ence of the instincts), and conscious experience from the symbolization and 
communication of such primary experience as art, myth, narrative, exposition, 
and culture. 
 
18. Panexperientialism. This theory derived from Whitehead posits that fleet-
ing moments of experience occur ‘all the way down’ in Nature, right into momen-
tary ‘occasions of experience’ in sub-atomic interactions. As evolution becomes 
more complex, experience is extended by compound organic entities. Only hu-
mans, however, have the freedom to become conscious of their own experiencing 
and to more or less control it. Also known as panprotopsychism (e.g., Hameroff & 
Penrose, 1996). (Also see Griffin, 1998b; de Quincey, 2002; Skrbina, 2009). 
Some panexperientialistic Journal of Consciousness Studies articles include 
Burns & Engdahl, 1998; Griffin, 1998a; de Quincey, 1994; de Quincey, 2000a; de 
Quincey, 2000b; and Seager, 1995.) 
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19. Physics and Quantum Potentia. Edging into more rarified theory yet re-
lated to the above, many of those who equate quantum phenomena with con-
sciousness see non-conscious experience as the state of the organism before the 
collapse of the wave function (or before the backaction of the pilot wave in Bohm 
or before the opening of the quantum gate in Eccles) which leads to the en-
hancement of experience into conscious experience of a solid ‘external’ world. 
(See, e.g., Bohm, 1980; Stapp, 1979; Hameroff & Penrose, 1996; Penrose, 1994.) 
 
20. H.O.T. and Speech Theorists. Higher Order Thought or Higher Order 
Perception philosophers have long insisted that self-consciousness is not a spe-
cialized form of consciousness but is, in reality, consciousness itself. That leaves a 
whole realm of fauna from those who indulge in lower order cognition down to 
those who have no cognition at all that must be considered to be experiencing 
their existence non-consciously. (See, e.g., Carruthers, 1996; Gennaro, 1996; Ly-
can, 1997; Rosenthal, 1993.) Dewart (1989) and Kerby (1991) well represent other 
yet similar positions – voluntary speech assertion and narrative subjectivity re-
spectively — which hold that some form of language use brings experience across 
the threshold into conscious agency. Daniel Dennett (1991) sees selfhood as but a 
narrative center of gravity. It is not too far a stretch from here to the linguistic 
deconstructionists for whom all our conscious knowledge is but the play of lan-
guage. As Émile Benveniste (1971) put it: ‘It is in and through language that man 
constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone constitutes the concept 
of “ego” in reality, in its reality which is that of the being’ (p. 224). 
 
21. Psi, otherwise known as supersensory or extra-sensory perception. In the 
main, our culture denies this possibility so our experiences of extraordinary 
awareness are mostly left non-conscious. Most research (as well as countless eve-
ryday anecdotes) suggests everyone experiences veridical intuitions at least some 
of the time. Rarely are such insights given conscious attention, however. In this 
light Radin’s (1997) superlative study of psi phenomena, The Conscious Universe, 
might better have been called The Experiencing But Only Occasionally Con-
scious Universe. (Also see, for example, Tart, Puthoff, & Targ, 2002; Schmicker, 
2002.) 
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